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Safeguarding the public's health, safety, and security took on new
meaning and urgency after the attacks on the World Trade Towers in
New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. on September 11,
2001. On October 4, 2001, a Florida man named Robert Stevens was
diagnosed with inhalational anthrax.1 The intentional dispersal of
anthrax through the U.S. postal system in New York, Washington,
Pennsylvania and other locations resulted in five confirmed deaths,
hundreds treated, and thousands tested.2  The potential for new, lar-
ger, and more sophisticated attacks have created a sense of vulnerabil-
ity. National attention has urgently turned to the need to rapidly detect
and react to bioterrorism, as well as to naturally occurring infectious
diseases.
In the aftermath of September 11 , the President and the Congress
began a process to strengthen the public health infrastructure.3 The
Center for Law and the Public's Health (CLPH) at Georgetown and
Johns Hopkins Universities drafted the Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act ("MSEHPA or the "Model Act")4 at the request of
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and in collabora-
tion with members of national organizations representing governors,
legislators, attorneys general, and health commissioners. Because the
power to act to preserve the public's health is constitutionally reserved
primarily to the states as an exercise of their police powers,5 the
1 Larry M. Bush et al., Index Case of Fatal Inhalational Anthrax Due to
Bioterrorism in the United States, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1607, 1607 (2001) (detailing
the hospitalization of the patient); see also John A. Jernigan et al., Bioterrorism-
Related Inhalational Anthrax: The First 10 Cases Reported in the United States, 7
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 933, 934 (2001) (explaining the medical indications
and treatment for ten cases of anthrax).
2 See Daniel B. Jernigan et al., Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related An-
thrax, United States, 2001: Epidemiologic Findings, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 1019, 1019 (2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol8no10/02-0353.htm (noting that there were five
fatalities as a result of the recent anthrax scare); see also Morton N. Swartz, Recogni-
tion and Management of Anthrax - An Update. 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1621, 1621
(2001), available at http://www.nejm.org (summarizing anthrax problem of 2001).
3 See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003: Protecting the
Homeland 15, 19 (2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/pdf/bud05.pdf (proposing to spend
"$1.2 billion in 2003 to increase the capacity of state and local health delivery sys-
tems to respond to bioterrorism attacks").
4 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (The Ctr. for Law and the
Pub.'s Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Univs., Proposed Draft 2001), avail-
able at http://www.publichealthlaw.net (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
5 E.g., LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 47 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2000) (discussing constitutional authorization to
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Model Act is designed for state - not federal - legislative considera-
tion. It provides responsible state actors with the powers they need to
detect and contain a potentially catastrophic disease outbreak and, at
the same time, protects individual rights and freedoms. Thirty-six
states and the District of Columbia have introduced legislative bills
based on the MSEHPA; thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia
have enacted or are expected to shortly enact a version of the Model
Act.6
Despite its success in many states, the Model Act has become a
lightening rod for criticism from both ends of the political spectrum. 7
It has galvanized public debate around the appropriate balance be-
tween personal rights and common goods.8
In this Commentary, I first offer a brief context for understanding
bioterrorism and naturally occurring infectious diseases - their history
and challenges. This background demonstrates the vast potential for
serious harm to the population. Next, I examine the state of infectious
disease law among the states. Infectious disease law in the United
States is riddled with problems, including its antiquity, inconsistency,
barriers to effective action, and absence of safeguards of personal
liberty. Third, I describe two national efforts for law reform: the
protect the common good).
6 As of April 21, 2003, states enacting or expected shortly to enact legisla-
tion influenced by the Model Act were Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Ver-
mont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Other states that have introduced legisla-
tion based on the Model Act were California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming. Cen-
ter for Law and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Uni-
versities, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act State Legislative
Activity, at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPALegActivity_050102.
pdf (last modified Oct. 1, 2002). See also Justin Gillis, States Weighing Laws to
Fight Bioterrorism, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2001, at Al (discussing the antiquated
nature of existing state public health laws); Sarah Lueck, States Seek to Strengthen
Emergency Powers: Movement Is Raising Privacy and Civil-Liberties Concerns,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2002, at A26.
7 See Ronald Bayer & James Colgrove, Public Health vs. Civil Liberties,
297 SCIENCE 1811, 1811 (2002) (describing the criticism in response to the first and
second draft of the Model Act raised by AIDS advocates, physicians, hospitals, anti-
vaccination advocates, privacy advocates, and civil liberties advocates).
8 See, e.g., George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liber-
ties, 346 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1337 (2002), available at http://www.nejm.org (arguing
that civil liberties do not necessarily have to be sacrificed even in a public health
emergency).
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"Turning Point" Model Public Health Act and the Model Emergency
Health Powers Act. The Turning Point Model Public Health Law, due
for completion in late 2003, will state the missions, functions, and
powers of public health agencies in the twenty first century. The
Model Emergency Health Powers Act is designed to provide special
powers to rapidly identify and respond to bioterrorism or a naturally
occurring infectious disease that poses a grave immediate threat to the
population. Fourth, I offer a defense of MSEHPA, by first describing
the drafting process and then, outlining and responding to the main
objections of critics. In particular, I respond to arguments relating to
federalism, emergency declarations, abuse of power, personal liber-
tarianism, economic libertarianism, and safeguards of property and
persons. I conclude with some reflections about individual interests
and common goods in America. Our culture during the latter part of
the twentieth century has been highly individualistic, stressing the
importance of the autonomous person and the undeterred entrepre-
neur. Certainly, these values have served America well in enhancing
personal freedoms and contributing to a thriving economy. However,
we have lost a sense of community and inter-relatedness that are
equally vital to human well-being. Without protection of health,
safety and security, people cannot enjoy many of the personal and
economic freedoms that we have come to take for granted. 9
I. BACKGROUND
Both naturally occurring infectious diseases' ° and bioterrorism
pose threats to public health. Historically, major naturally occurring
infectious disease outbreaks have killed far more people than war: the
bubonic plague in the 140h century lead to the death of approximately
25 million Europeans, over a quarter of the population;" diseases such
as smallpox, tuberculosis, measles, influenza, typhus and bubonic
plague killed an estimated 95% of pre-Columbian Native American
9 See, e.g., Dan E. Beauchamp, THE HEALTH OF THE REPUBLIC: EPIDEMICS,
MEDICINE, AND MORALISM AS CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY (1998); James F. Chil-
dress, et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 170
(2002) (generally discussing how the pursuance of public health necessarily infringes
on personal autonomy).
10 Infectious diseases are diseases caused by a living organism or other
pathogen, including a fungus, bacteria, parasite, protozoan, or virus, which may or
may not be transmissible from person to person, animal to person, or insect to person.
11 See ROY M. ANDERSON & ROBERT M. MAY, INFECTIOUS DISEASES OF
HUMAN: DYNAMICS AND CONTROL, 1 (1992) (showing impact of bubonic plague on
Europe).
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populations;12 and a worldwide influenza epidemic in 1918-1919 re-
sulted in the death of 21 million people.1 3 While naturally occurring
infectious disease may no longer be the leading cause of death in the
United States because of advancements in hygiene, nutrition and
medicine, the death toll is still substantial. 14 Each year approximately
170,000 Americans die from infectious diseases.1 5 Emerging or re-
surgent diseases 6 such as West Nile Virus' 7 pose modem threats to
America's health. 18 A report by the National Intelligence Council for
the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that infectious disease is
not only a public health issue, but also a problem of national security:
the U.S. population is vulnerable to bioterrorism as well as emerging
and reemerging infectious diseases.' 
9
Preventing major disease outbreaks poses as great a challenge as
ever before. The globalization of travel and trade allows for the wide-
spread, rapid transmission of disease. Even though infectious disease
is no longer a leading cause of death in the United States, internation-
ally, infectious disease continues to be a leading cause of death.20 A
12 JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN
SOCIETIES 211-12 (1999). For a discussion of the prevalence of tuberculosis in human
history, see Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Resurgent Tuberculosis Epidemic in the Era of
AIDS: Reflections on Public Health, Law, and Society, 54 MD. L. REV. 1 (1995).
13 Bradley N. Doebbeling, Influenza, in MAXCY-ROSENAU-LAST PUBLIC
HEALTH & PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 107, 108 (Robert B. Wallace ed., 14 th ed. 1998).14 See Robert N. Anderson, Deaths: Leading Causes for 1999, 49 NAT'L
VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 1 (Oct. 2001), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr49/nvsr49_1 1.pdf (compiling cause of death
information and finding infectious diseases are no longer a top cause of deaths in the
United States).
15 NAT'L. INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, THE GLOBAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREAT
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, NIE 99-17D (Jan. 2000), at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/report/nie99-17d.html (noting that "[a]nnual
infectious disease-related death rates in the United States have nearly doubled to some
170,000 annually after reaching an historic low in 1980").
16 See, e.g., Mary E. Wilson, Infectious Diseases: An Ecological Perspec-
tive, 311 BRIT. MED J. 1681 (1995), available at http://bmj.com (describing how
today's socioeconomic, political, environmental, and climatic states are leading to the
resurgence of infectious diseases).
17 In 2002, over 2500 cases of West Nile virus in humans have been reported
to the CDC, with 125 fatalities thus far. Press Release, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, West Nile Virus Update (Oct. 3, 2002), at
http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/r021003.htm.
18 The threat to the public's health from infectious diseases is exacerbated by
antibiotic resistance to standard medications. See, e.g., Stuart B. Levy, Antibiotic
Availability and Use: Consequences to Man and His Environment, 44 J. CLINICAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY 83S, 83S (1991).
19 NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, supra note 15.
20 Wilson, supra note 16, at 1681 (stating that infectious diseases are still the
HEAL TH MA4 TRIX
person infected in Hong Kong can travel to the United States in less
than a day. Large concentrations of people also facilitate the spread
of disease, and many cities have populations in the millions. Even in
contemporary societies human populations remain in close proximity
to animal populations. Some of the most deadly human diseases are
believed to have evolved from animal diseases.
In addition to the threat of severe, naturally occurring infectious
diseases, recent events highlight the threat of bioterrorism. Bioterror-
ism is the intentional use of a pathogen or biological product to cause
harm to a human, animal, plant, or other living organism to influence
the conduct of government or to intimidate or coerce a civilian popu-
lation. This risk of bioterrorism is severe and the results could be
devastating. In 1999, the U.S. Commission on National Security in
the 21 st Century concluded that biological agents are the most likely
choice of weapons for disaffected states and groups.2' Biological
weapons are nearly as easy to develop, will likely become easier to
deliver, and are far more lethal than chemical weapons;22 and, unlike
nuclear weapons, biological weapons are inexpensive to produce and
the risk of detection is low.
23
While experts have long been calling attention to the threat of
bioterrorism and the unique problems that arise in modem society,24
technological advances even further amplify this threat. For example,
leading single cause of death in the world).
21 U.S. Comm'n on Nat'l Sec. 21st Century, NEW WORLD COMING:
AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: SUPPORTING RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS:
THE PHASE I REPORT ON THE EMERGING GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE
FIRST QUARTER OF THE 2 1 ST CENTURY 50 (1999).
22 In 1993, the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment esti-
mated that the aerosolized release of 100 kg of anthrax spores upwind of Washington,
DC could result in approximately 130,000 to 3 million deaths, a weapon as deadly as
a hydrogen bomb. Thomas V. Inglesby et al., Anthrax as a Biological Weapon:
Medical and Public Health Management, 281 JAMA 1735, 1736 (1999), available at
http://www.jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v28 nl 8/ffull/jst80027.html.
23 U.S. Comm'n on Nat'l Sec. /21st Century, supra note 21, at 50.
24 See James M. Hughes, The Emerging Threat of Bioterrorism, 5 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 494 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/ (ex-
plaining challenges of national and local preparedness in the face of a potentially
large geographic dispersion of the microbial agent during its inoculation period);
Donald A. Henderson, The Looming Threat of Bioterrorism, 283 SCIENCE 1279,
1279-91 (1999) (explaining the history of the threat of bioterrorism);_Thomas V.
Inglesby, et al., Preventing the Use of Biological Weapons: Improving Response
Should Prevention Fail, 30 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 926, 926-28 (2000),
available at http://www.joumals.uchicago.edu/CID/joumal/home.html (explaining the
increasing danger of a bioterrorist attack and the steps that can be taken to minimize
its consequences); Leonard A. Cole, The Specter of Biological Weapons, SCI. AM.
Dec. 1996, at 60, 62-63 (noting the widespread development of biological weapons).
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the Internet, which allows for the widespread dissemination of infor-
mation on biological agents and technology, and advancements -in
biotechnology make bioproduction capabilities accessible to individu-
als with limited experience. The dual use nature of this knowledge
and technology - allowing for both legitimate and illicit use - makes
tracking and identifying bioterrorists much more difficult. And while
certain countries are known or suspected to have biological weapons
programs, non-state actors have become important as well. Docu-
ments recovered in Afghanistan suggest that Al Qaeda has conducted
extensive research on weapons that can cause mass fatalities, includ-
ing biological weapons.
Government and public health officials must be able to react
quickly and intelligently to a potentially catastrophic disease outbreak,
whether intentionally instigated (i.e., bioterrorism) or naturally occur-
ring. Two exercises, Dark Winter (smallpox) 2 6 and TOPOFF
(plague),27 simulated biological attacks in the United States to test
government response and raise awareness of the bioterrorism threat.
Both simulations demonstrated serious weaknesses in the U.S. public
health system that could prevent an effective response to bioterror-
ism 28 or severe, naturally occurring infectious diseases.29 The federal
government intends to repeat these modeling exercises to test whether
increased preparedness since September 1 1th will result in a more effi-
cient response to bioterrorism.
25 Robert Cottrell, Safe Houses Yielding Documents on Weapons of Mass
Destruction, FN. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001.
26 Tara O'Toole, Shining Light on "Dark Winter", 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 972, 972 (2002), available at
http://www.j ournals.uchicago.edu/CID/joumal/issues/v34n7/020165/020165.html
(reporting results of a simulation of National Security Council meetings in response to
a small pox outbreak in three states).
27 Thomas V. Inglesby et al., A Plague on Your City: Observations from
TOPOFF, 32 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 436 (2001), available at
http://www.joumals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v32n3/001347/001347.html
(reporting the results and lessons learned from a simulation of a bioweapons attack).
2 See Joseph Barbera, Anthony Macintyre, Larry Gostin et al., Large-Scale
Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the United States: Scientific Examina-
tion, Logistic and Legal Limits, and Possible Consequences, 286 JAMA 2711, 2713-
15 (Dec. 5, 2001), available at http://jama.ama-
assn.org/issues/v286n21/ffull/jsc10254.html (noting that large scale, hastily imple-
mented quarantines often have unintended adverse consequences).
See The Threat of Bioterrorism and the Spread of Infectious Diseases.
Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 107th
Cong. 62-70 (2001) (testimony of Donald A. Henderson), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate 11sh107.html.
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II. THE NEED FOR LAW REFORM
Law has long been considered an important tool of public
health.30  Although federal law-making authority is constitutionally
limited in scope, states have more flexibility in legislating to protect
the public's health as an exercise of their broader police powers. State
public health laws create a mission for public health authorities, as-
sign their functions, and specify the manner in which they may exer-
cise their authority. 31 Prior to September 11, 2001, some states had
legislatively (e.g., Colorado)32 or administratively (e.g., Rhode Is-
land)33 developed public health response plans for a bioterrorism
event. However, problems of obsolescence, inconsistency, and inade-
quacy may render some public health laws ineffective, or even coun-
terproductive.34 Reforming state public health law can improve the
legal infrastructure to help respond to bioterrorism and other emerging
threats.
Many state public health statutes were built up in layers during the
twentieth century in response to each new disease threat. These out-
dated laws often do not reflect contemporary scientific understandings
of disease (e.g., surveillance, prevention, and response). When many
of these statutes were written, public health sciences such as epidemi-
ology and biostatistics were in their infancy and modem prevention
and treatment methods did not exist.
At the same time, many existing public health laws pre-date the
vast changes in constitutional (e.g., equal protection and due process)
and statutory (e.g., disability discrimination) law that have trans-
formed social and legal conceptions of individual rights. Conse-
quently, these laws do not reflect legal norms for protection of indi-
vidual rights. Failure to reform these laws may leave public health
authorities vulnerable to legal challenge on grounds that they are un-
constitutional or preempted by modem federal statutes. Even if state
30 See generally LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A
READER (2002).
31 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law Reform, 91 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1365 (2001).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-32-2103, 2104 (2001).
33 R.I. Dep't of Health, Bioterrorism Preparedness Program, at
http://www.healthri.org/environment/biot/home.htm (describing a program funded by
the CDC in 1999 to expand and upgrade the ability of Rhode Island to detect and
respond to biological and chemical agents and to provide a public health response to
terrorist acts in the United States) (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
34 See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH: A
STUDY OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59,
101-17 (1999).
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public health law is not challenged in court, public health authorities
may feel unsure about applying old legal remedies to modem health
threats.
Health codes among the fifty states and territories have evolved
independently, leading to profound variation in the structure, sub-
stance, and procedures for detecting, controlling, and preventing dis-
ease. Ordinarily different state approaches are not a problem, but
variation could prevent or delay an efficient response in a multi-state
public health emergency. Infectious diseases are rarely confined to
single jurisdictions, but pose risks within whole regions or the nation
itself. Coordination among state and national authorities is vital, but
is undermined by disparate legal structures.
Public health laws remain fragmented within states as well as
among them. Most state statutes have evolved over time so that, even
within the same state, different rules may apply depending on the par-
ticular disease in question. This means that necessary authority (e.g.,
screening, reporting, or compulsory treatment) may be absent for a
given disease. For example, when a resurgence of multi-drug resistant
tuberculosis swept major metropolitan areas in the 1990s, many stat-
utes did not allow for directly observed therapy.35 Worse still, state
laws can be so complex that they may not be well understood by
health practitioners or their attorneys, preventing practitioners from
acting rapidly and decisively in an emergency.
Many current laws not only provide insufficient authority to act,
but might actually thwart effective action. This is evident when one
examines the key variables for public health preparedness: planning,
coordination and communication, surveillance, management of prop-
erty, and protection of persons.
State statutes generally fail to require planning or to establish
mechanisms. As a result most states have not systematically designed
a strategy to respond to public health emergencies. Perhaps the most
important aspects of planning are clear communication and coordina-
tion among responsible governmental officials and the private sector.
As the recent anthrax outbreaks demonstrate,3 6 there should be a de-
fined role for public health, law enforcement, and emergency man-
agement agencies. So too, should there be coordination among the
35 Comm. on the Elimination of Tuberculosis in the U.S., Inst. of Med.,
Ending Neglect: The Elimination of Tuberculosis in the United States (Lawrence
Geiter, ed., 2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309070287/htm.
36 See H. Clifford Lane & Anthony S. Fauci, Bioterrorism on the Home
Front: A New Challenge for American Medicine, 286 JAMA 2595, 2596 (2001) (not-
ing the importance of "rapid dissemination of reliable, up-to-date information" to
successfully meet the challenges presented by anthrax).
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various levels (e.g., federal, tribal, state, and local) and branches (leg-
islative, executive, and judicial) of government as well as with private
actors, particularly the health care and pharmaceutical sectors. A sys-
tematic planning process that involves all stakeholders improves
communication and coordination. The law can require such planning
and sharing of information. However, many public health statutes do
not facilitate communication and, due to federal and state privacy
concerns, may actually proscribe exchange of vital information among
public health, law enforcement, and emergency management agencies.
Indeed, some statutes even prohibit sharing data with public health
officials in adjoining states by strictly limiting disclosures by the pub-
lic health agency that holds the data, often in the interest of protecting
individual privacy.37 Laws that complicate or hinder data communi-
cation among states and responsible agencies would impede a thor-
ough investigation and response to such a public health emergency.
Surveillance is critical to public health preparedness. Unlike most
forms of terrorism, the dispersal of pathogens may not be evident.
Early detection could save many lives by triggering an effective con-
tainment strategy such as vaccination, treatment and, if necessary,
isolation or quarantine. However, current statutes do not facilitate
surveillance and may even prevent monitoring. For example, many
states do not require timely reporting for certain dangerous ("Category
A") agents of bioterrorism such as smallpox, anthrax, plague, botu-
lism, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers.38 In fact, virtually no
state requires immediate reporting for all the critical agents identified
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.39 At the same
time, states do not require, and may actually prohibit, public health
agencies from monitoring data collected in the health care system.
Private information that might lead to early detection (e.g., unusual
clusters of fevers or gastrointestinal symptoms) held by hospitals,
managed care organizations, and pharmacies may be unavailable to
public health officials. New federal health information privacy pro-
tections may unintentionally impede the flow of data from private to
37 See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Public Health Information Infrastruc-
ture: A National Review of the Law on Health Information Privacy, 275 JAMA 1921,
1925 (1996) (surveying the protection of public health data collected by states).
38 See Lisa D. Rotz et al., Public Health Assessment of Potential Biological
Terrorism Agents, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES (Feb. 2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no2/01-0164.htm (explaining the classification
process of critical biological agents for public health preparedness).
39 See Heather H. Horton H et al., Critical Biological Agents: Disease Re-
porting as a Tool for Bioterrorism Preparedness, 30 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 262, 264
(2002) (noting that virtually no state requires reporting of all 24 critical biological
agents identified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention).
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public sectors despite regulators' attempt to broadly exempt public
health information sharing from nondisclosure rules.4°
Coercive powers are the most controversial aspects of any legal
system. Nevertheless, they may be necessary to manage property or
protect persons in a public health emergency. There are numerous
circumstances that might require management of property in a public
health emergency - e.g., shortages of vaccines, medicines, hospital
beds, or facilities for disposal of corpses. It may even be necessary to
close facilities or destroy property that is contaminated or dangerous.
Even in the case of a relatively small outbreak, such as the recent an-
thrax attacks, the government considered the need to compulsorily
license proprietary medications and destroy contaminated facilities.4'
The law must provide authority, with fair safeguards, to manage prop-
erty that is needed to contain a serious health threat.
There similarly may be a need to exercise powers over individuals
to avert a significant threat to the public's health. Vaccination, test-
ing, physical examination, treatment, isolation, and quarantine each
may help contain the spread of infectious diseases. Although the vast
majority of people probably will comply willingly (because it is in
their own interests and/or desirable for the common welfare), some
compulsory powers are necessary for those who will not comply.
Provided those powers are bounded by legal safeguards, individuals
should be required to yield some of their autonomy, liberty or prop-
erty to protect the health and security of the community.
The view I have expressed, that public health law is outdated and
needs to be reformed, is now well accepted. The Institute of Medicine
(1OM), in its foundational 1988 report, The Future of Public Health,
acknowledged that law was essential to public health but cast serious
doubt on the soundness of public health's legal basis. Concluding that
"this nation has lost sight of its public health goals and has allowed
the system of public health activities to fall into disarray," the IOM
40 See Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Personal Privacy and
Common Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the National Health Informa-
tion Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1453 (2002) (noting that "public health
authorities may not be able to share relevant data with law enforcement or emergency
management agencies even in the event of bioterrorism" and "public health authori-
ties may not be permitted to monitor health care data in hospitals, managed care or-
ganizations, and pharmacies, even though these data may provide an early warning of
an infectious disease outbreak or bioterrorism").
41 Ed Silverman & David Schwab, U.S. Will Respect Cipro Patent - Feds
Opt Not to Allow Copies of Antibiotic, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Oct. 18,
2001 (noting that one U.S. Senator asked the White House to invoke a law that per-
mits federal officials to both disregard a federal patent and issue a compulsory license
to others companies).
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recommended reform of an obsolete and inadequate body of enabling
laws and regulations.42 In its 2002 report, The Future of the Public's
Health in the Twenty First Century, the IOM notes that little progress
has been made in implementing its 1988 proposal. The committee
recommends, "public health law be reformed so that it conforms to
modem scientific and legal standards, is more consistent within and
among states, and is more uniform in its approach to different health
threats. 43
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in
Healthy People 2010, similarly argued that strong laws are a vital
component of the pubic health infrastructure and recommended that
states reform their outdated statutes.44 The CDC, building on HHS'
recommendation, advised, "all health departments [should] have suf-
ficient public health laws and authorities to carry out the essential
pubic health services. 45 Indeed, the "overarching goal" of the public
health component of the CDC Bioterrorism Preparedness Program is
"to develop state and local public health systems' full legal prepared-
ness."
46
IlI. THE TURNING POINT MODEL PUBLIC HEALTH
ACT
In response to a sustained critique of the crumbling public health
infrastructure, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, in partnership
with the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, initiated the "Turning Point pro-
ject in 1996: "Collaborating for a New Century in Public Health."
Turning Point launched five National Excellence Collaboratives in
2000, including the Public Health Statute Modernization Collabora-
tive. The Collaborative's mission is "to transform and strengthen the
legal framework for the public health system through a collaborative
process to develop a model public health law."
42 COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED.,
THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1988).
43 INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH IN THE TWENTY FIRST
CENTURY (forthcoming 2002).
44 See 2 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010,
23-18 (2000), available at
http://www.health.gov/healthypeople/document/tableofcontents.htm (noting the im-
portance of a national model law).
45 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PUBLIC HEALTH'S
INFRASTRUCTURE: A STATUS REPORT, at V (2002), available at
http://www.naccho.org/files/Infrastructure.pdf.
46 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PUBLIC HEALTH LEGAL
PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM (July 17, 2002) (unpublished).
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The Public Health Statute Modernization Collaborative is led by a
consortium of states, in partnership with federal agencies and national
organizations. The collaborative contracted with the author to draft a
model public health act under the guidance of a national expert com-
mittee. It has published a comprehensive assessment of state public
health laws, demonstrating the inadequacies of existing law to support
modem pubic health functions.47 The objective is to ensure that state
public health law is consistent with modem constitutional principles
and reflects current scientific and ethical values underlying public
health practice. The Turning Point Model Public Health Act will fo-
cus on the organization, delivery, and funding of essential public
health services and functions. It is scheduled for completion by Octo-
ber 2003, and current drafts are available on the Internet.48
IV. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH
POWERS ACT
The pace of completion of the Turning Point Model Public Health
Act was too slow to meet political and social needs for increased secu-
rity following September 11th, 2001. Consequently, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services embarked on a rapid process to
help the states improve their public health law infrastructure. 49 The
concept was to build a model that states could adapt to their own
needs in a federalist system.
From a practical and political perspective, it is important that any
model law draw its legitimacy from recognized sources of authority.
The MSEHPA's theoretical foundations and structures are derived
from: (1) existing federal or state law that offers model language; (2)
47 LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN & JAMES G. HODGE, JR., STATE PUBLIC HEALTH
LAW ASSESSMENT REPORT 1-2 (Apr. 2002), available at
http://turningpointprogram.org/Pages/PHSCPH statute-report_070302.pdf (noting
that existing statutes often "(1) pre-date modem scientific and constitutional devel-
opments; (2) fail to equip public health officials with a range of flexible powers
needed to control infectious disease; (3) do not address modem conditions which
impact public health; (4) lack adequate standards of privacy, due process, and risk
assessment; and (5) are based on arbitrary disease classification schemes that no
longer relate to modem disease threats or epidemiologic methods of infection con-
trol").
48 THE MODEL STATE PUB. ACT (Turning Point Pub. Health Statute Moderni-
zation Nat'l Collaborative, Tentative Draft 2002), available at
http://tumingpointprogram.org/Pages/phsc MSPH%20Act3.pdf (May 31, 2002).
49 See Press Release, Statement by HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson
Regarding the Model Emergency Health Powers Act, Dep't Health & Human Servs.
(Oct. 30, 2001), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20011030.html.
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lessons derived from theoretical exercises such as TOPOFF and Dark
Winter; and (3) a meeting of high-level experts in public health,
emergency management, and national security that took place at the
Cantigny Conference Center in April, 2001.50 The Center for Law
and the Public's Health received comments on the Model Act from
government agencies, national organizations, academic institutions,
practitioners, and the general public. MSEHPA, therefore, expresses
an attempted best synthesis of advice, recommendations, and dialogue
regarding the purpose of emergency public health law, its proper
reach, and the protection of civil liberties and private property. (See
Table for an outline of the MSEHPA).
Table 1: Outline of Provisions Included in the Model Act
ARTICLE I Title, Findings, Purposes, and Definitions
ARTICLE Planning for a Public Health Emergency
II
ARTICLE Measures to Detect and Track Public
III Health Emergencies
ARTICLE Declaring a State of Public Health Emer-
IV gency
ARTICLE Special Powers During a State of Public
V Health Emergency: Management of Property
ARTICLE Special Powers During a State of Public
VI Health Emergency: Protection of Persons
ARTICLE Public Information Regarding Public
VII Health Emergency
ARTICLE Miscellaneous
VIII
The purpose of the MSEHPA is to facilitate the detection, man-
agement and containment of public health emergencies while appro-
priately safeguarding personal and proprietary interests. The Model
Act gives rise to two kinds of public health powers and duties: Those
that exist in the pre-emergency environment ("pre-declaration pow-
ers" found in Articles II and III) and a separate group of powers and
duties that come into effect only after a state's Governor declares a
50 THE CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE AM. BAR Ass'N
STANDING COMM. ON LAW AND NAT'L SEC., THE NAT'L STRATEGY FORUM, THE
ALFRED P. SLOAN FOUND, CANTIGNY CONFERENCE: STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH
POWERS & THE BIOTERRORISM THREAT, Chicago, at
http://www.nationalstrategy.com/april%20conference.htm (Apr. 26-27, 2001).
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public health emergency (the "post-declaration powers" of Articles V,
VI and VII). Post-declaration powers deliberately are broader and
more robust.
Under Article IV, a Governor may declare a public health emer-
gency only if a series of demanding threshold conditions are met: (1)
an occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition, that
(2) is caused by bioterrorism or a new or re-emerging infectious agent
or biological toxin previously controlled and that (3) also poses a high
probability of a large number of deaths, a large number of serious or
long-term disabilities, or widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic
agent that poses a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large
number of persons. Recognizing the continuing threat of infectious
disease, the Model Act as drafted is not limited to bioterrorism emer-
gencies: a mass epidemic could be sufficiently severe to trigger the
Model Act's provisions even if naturally occurring provided that the
infectious agent is novel or previously controlled. States may there-
fore choose to enhance and further strengthen the threshold conditions
for invoking the Model Act, perhaps by including a requirement that
the security, safety or normal operation of the State be threatened be-
fore an emergency may be declared. States may also choose an "all
hazards" approach that adds chemical and nuclear threats to the bio-
logical threats contemplated by the Model Act. The MSEHPA re-
quires the Governor to consult with the public health authority and
other experts prior to declaring an emergency (unless the delay would
endanger the public's health); specifies minimum information to be
provided in an emergency declaration; and authorizes the suspension
of ordinary State rules or regulations to facilitate emergency response.
The legislature, by majority vote, may discontinue the state of emer-
gency at any time.
The pre-declaration powers and duties are those necessary to pre-
pare for and promptly identify a public health emergency. Under Ar-
ticle II ("Planning for a public health emergency"), the Public Health
Emergency Planning Commission (appointed by the Governor) must
prepare a plan which includes: coordination of services; procurement
of necessary materials and supplies; housing, feeding, and caring for
affected populations (with appropriate regard for their physical and
cultural/social needs); and the proper vaccination and treatment of
individuals in the event of a public health emergency.
Article III ("Measures to detect and track public health emergen-
cies") addresses measures necessary to detect initially and then to
follow a developing public health emergency, including prompt (24
hours) reporting requirements for health care providers, pharmacists,
veterinarians and laboratories. Public health professionals must inter-
view and counsel persons exposed to illnesses that may cause a public
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health emergency and their contacts. Additionally, the public health
authority must investigate physical materials or facilities endangering
the public's health. MSEHPA recognizes that exchange of relevant
data among lead agencies is essential to assure the public's health and
security. Public health, emergency management, and public safety
authorities, therefore, are required to share information necessary to
prevent, treat, control, or investigate a public health emergency.
The Model Act provides "special powers" that may be used only
after a Governor declares a state of public health emergency. Article
V ("Management of property") provides that the State's designated
public health authority may close, decontaminate, or procure facilities
and materials to respond to a public health emergency; safely dispose
of infectious waste; and obtain and deploy health care supplies. The
authorities are required to exercise their powers with respect for cul-
tural and religious beliefs and practices, such as observing, wherever
possible, religious laws regarding burial. Compensation of private
property owners is provided if there is a "taking" - i.e., the govern-
ment confiscates private property for public purposes (e.g., the use of
a private infirmary to treat and/or isolate patients). No compensation
would be provided for "nuisance abatements" - i.e., the government
destroys property or closes an establishment that poses a serious
health threat. This comports with the extant constitutional "takings"
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.51 If the government were forced
to compensate for all nuisance abatements, it would significantly chill
public health regulation.
The provisions for protection of persons found in Article VI
("Protection of persons") deal with some of the most sensitive areas
within the MSEHPA. The Model Act permits public health authori-
ties to: physically examine or test individuals as necessary to diag-
nose or to treat illness; vaccinate or treat individuals to prevent or
ameliorate an infectious disease; and isolate or quarantine individuals
to prevent or limit the transmission of a contagious disease. The pub-
lic health authority also may waive licensing requirements for health
care professionals and direct them to assist in vaccination, testing,
examination, and treatment of patients.
While the Model Act reaffirms the authority over persons and
property that health agencies have always had, it supplements these
traditional public health powers with a modernized, extensive set of
51 E.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1004
(1992) (noting that no compensation is required under the "Takings Clause" of the
Constitution for regulations that prohibit nuisances).
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conditions, principles, and requirements governing the use of personal
control measures that are now often lacking in state public health law.
Public health officials are explicitly directed to respect individual reli-
gious objections to vaccination and treatment. Officials must follow
specified legal standards before utilizing isolation or quarantine,
which are authorized only to prevent the transmission of contagious
disease to others and must be by the least restrictive means available.
This allows individuals, for example, to be confined in their own
homes. The Model Act also affords explicit protections to persons in
isolation or quarantine that go beyond most existing state laws: the
public health authority is affirmatively charged with maintaining
places of isolation or quarantine in a safe and hygienic manner; regu-
larly monitoring the health of residents; and systematically and com-
petently meeting the needs of persons isolated or quarantined for ade-
quate food, clothing, shelter, means of communication, medication,
and medical care. Orders for isolation or quarantine are subject to
judicial review, under strict time guidelines and with appointed coun-
sel; the Model Act also provides for expedited judicial relief.
Finally, the Model Act provides for a set of post-declaration pow-
ers and duties to ensure appropriate public information and communi-
cation (Article VII: "Public information regarding public health emer-
gency"). The public health authority must provide information to the
public regarding the emergency, including protective measures to be
taken and information regarding access to mental health support. Ex-
perience following September 1 1th and the anthrax attacks demon-
strated the need for an authoritative spokesperson for public health
providing comprehensible and accurate information. These events
also revealed the significant mental health implications of terrorism
on the population.52
The Model Act also recognizes that if government officials, health
professionals, and others are to fulfill their responsibilities for pre-
venting and responding to a serious health threat, they should not fear
unwarranted liability. Consequently, MSEHPA affords persons exer-
cising authority under the Model Act immunity from liability except
for gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Taken as a whole, MSEHPA resolves a series of difficult policy
debates in which the public health goals of facilitating the detection,
management and containment of public health emergencies are bal-
anced against the need to safeguard individuals' civil rights, liberties,
52 See Tara Parker-Pope, Anxious Americans Seek Antidepressants to Cope
with Terror, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2001, at BI (noting a 16% increase in new pre-
scriptions for anti-depressants following Sept. 11).
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and property. MSEHPA is an outgrowth of a process to identify and
legitimize critical public health functions against a framework of per-
sonal rights and freedoms protected by law.
A. Defense of the Model Act
There have been several specific objections to the Model Act:
federalism - federal, not state, law is implicated in a health crisis;
emergency declarations - the scope of a public health emergency is
overly broad; abuse of power - governors and public health officials
will act without sufficient justification; personal libertarianism -
compulsory powers over non-adherent individuals are rarely, or never,
necessary; economic libertarianism - regulation of businesses is
counter-productive; and safeguards of property and persons -
MSEHPA fails to provide strong protection of individual and eco-
nomic freedoms. Before examining, and responding to, these specific
objections, it will be helpful to explain the drafting process for the
Model Act.
1. Drafting Process for MSEHPA
Days after the first cases of anthrax were confirmed on October 4,
2001 the CDC's General Counsel asked the CLPH to draft the Model
Act. The assignment was to have a first draft completed within
weeks, requiring an enormous expenditure of energy and resources,
because governors and legislators actively sought guidance on legal
reform. To meet this deadline, the CLPH was assisted by a large
number of federal and state officials and scholars. The first draft of
the Model Act, posted on October 2 3rd, borrowed from many of the
best statutory provisions that existed at the state level. In this way, the
Model Act would not contain radical new powers that posed a threat
to civil liberties. And, MSEHPA would gain political credibility by
including statutory language from the states themselves. Following
release of the first draft, the Model Act was downloaded from the
Center's web site tens of thousands of times, provoking considerable
input by the public. MSEHPA is stronger because it was devised in a
politically inclusive manner, even in the face of severe time con-
straints and societal fears following September 1 1th .
The next, and current, version of the Model Act was posted on the
Center's web site on December 21, 2001. It contained a number of
changes from the original draft. Critics point to the differences be-
tween the first and second versions as evidence of the problems with
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MSEHPA.53 However, the CDC and CLPH intended from the begin-
ning to distribute the first draft widely for comment by stakeholders
and the public, and to revise the Act accordingly. Discussion and
comment on draft legal rules is common and expected in a delibera-
tive democracy.
Commentators raised several points. First, community organiza-
tions expressed fears that MSEHPA could be used to restrain persons
living with HIV/AIDS or could be introduced in response to an influ-
enza epidemic. The second draft made clear that MSEHPA is not, and
never was, intended for endemic diseases such as influenza or
HIV/AIDS (they are not "novel" or "previously controlled or eradi-
cated" diseases under the Act).54 Second, civil libertarians were con-
cemed that the governor needed a greater check on his or her author-
ity. The second draft, therefore, authorized the legislature to override
a governor's declaration by a simple majority right away, rather than
by a two-thirds majority after 60 days. Finally, in response to advo-
cates who expressed concern about the Model Act's criminal penalties
for disobeying an order for vaccination, treatment, or isolation, the
revised Model Act removed these penalties. Instead, individuals who
refused to comply with public health orders would, if necessary to
protect the public's health, be subject to isolation or quarantine.
2. Specific Objections to the Model Act
Commentators sometimes suggest that MSEHPA affords gover-
nors unchecked power - for example, the Model Act provides a
"blank check to impose the most draconian sorts of measures."55 The
Model Act, according to these reports, "puts a stranglehold on our
civil liberties. 56 These assessments, however, are based on misin-
formation. Rather than listening to, and reporting, the experienced
views of state and local health officials, the media preferred to stress
the objections of a few highly vocal critics.
The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons (AAPS), a
right-wing libertarian organization, for example, denounced the
53 See, e.g., Ronald Bayer & James Colgrove, Public Health vs. Civil Liber-
ties, 297 SCIENCE 1811 (2002) (noting the changes from the first and most recent
drafts of the model act).
54 The revised draft clarifies that a public health emergency applies to ill-
nesses or health conditions that are caused by bioterrorism or the appearance of a
novel orTpreviously controlled or eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin.
Mimi Hall, Many States Reject Bioterrorism Law; Opponents Say It's Too
Invasive, USA TODAY, July 23, 2002, at Al.
56 Marilyn Chase, Civil-Liberties Issues Check Plans to Counter Bioterror-
isM, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2002, at B1.
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Model Act, which "turns governors into dictators," permitting them to
"create a police state by fiat., 57 The Model Act, according to AAPS,
"commandeered" the talent and property of the health care industry,
representing a "raw assertion of power."5 8 Anti-vaccination advocates
attacked MSEHPA for authorizing mandatory vaccination. These
groups have opposed all forms of compulsory public health powers,
including school vaccination requirements.5 9 Finally, Boston Univer-
sity faculty members described the Model Act as "the old soviet
model of public health (lots of power and no standards for applying
it). '60 This group's distrust of governmental public health lies behind
its response to MSEHPA: "Unaccountable and untrustworthy public
health agencies are not only ineffective, they can ... destroy both life
and civil liberties.'
Critics' claims that MSEHPA does not have wide support are un-
true. During the single legislative session since its December 21,
2001 release, 36 states and the District of Columbia introduced legis-
lation based in whole or part on MSEHPA. Of these, 20 states and the
District of Columbia passed bills.62 Virtually all the rest of the states
used the Model Act in less formal ways to assess the adequacy of their
own laws and policies. Thus, states heeded the advice of Secretary for
Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson who asked officials to
use the Model Act as a yardstick against their own legislation. 63 To
further facilitate this process, the National Conference of State Legis-
57 Ass'N OF AM. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS, AAPS ANALYSIS: MODEL
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (MEHPA) TURNS GOVERNORS INTO DICTATORS
(2001), available at http://www.aapsonline.org/testimony/emerpower.htm (Dec. 3,
2001).
58 Id.
59 See, e.g., Press Release, National Vaccine Information Center, Vaccine
Safety Advocates Warn of Risks of Proposed Mass Smallpox Vaccination Policy
(Oct. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.909shot.com/PressReleases/prsmallpoxpolicy.htm (providing reasons for
not prematurely vaccinating the population against smallpox).
60 Letter from Boston area health law teachers to CLPH (Nov. 1, 2001).
61 George J. Annas, Bioterrorism and Civil Liberties, 347 NEw ENG. J. MED.
856, 857 (2002).
. 62 Center for Law and the Pub's. Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins
Univs., supra note 6 (describing relevant legislation).
63 See Justin Gillis, States Weighing Laws to Fight Bioterrorism, WASH.
POST, Nov. 19, 2001, at Al (mentioning that the Model Act had the backing of
Tommy Thompson, who specifically said, "[wie need not only a strong health infra-
structure and a full stockpile of medical resources, but also the legal and emergency
tools to help our citizens quickly").
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latures prepared a formal checklist of powers based on the Model
Act.'
The inflammatory rhetoric against MSEHPA may be useful po-
litically, but seriously mischaracterizes the Act and misleads the pub-
lic. Governors are not afforded plenary powers but have significant
checks and balances; vaccination is not a radical new power, but is
common in state law65 and constitutionally approved by the Supreme
Court.6 6 MSEHPA is not at all analogous to old Soviet law, but has
clear standards and procedures for the exercise of powers. Indeed,
nothing within MSEHPA is "extraordinary" or an unreasonable threat
to civil liberties. To the contrary, MSEHPA provides safeguards of
personal liberty that do not exist in most state statutes, as the follow-
ing discussion demonstrates.
3. Federalism
Critics argue that acts of terrorism are inherently federal matters,
eliminating the need for expansion of state public health powers.67 It
is certainly true that federal authority is extraordinarily important in
responding to catastrophic public health events. For example, bioter-
rorism may trigger national security concerns, require investigation of
federal offences, and affect geographic regions beyond state perime-
ters or even the entire country. Consequently, the federal government
often takes a leading role in responding to a public health emergency,
as they did in the anthrax outbreaks.68
Indeed, the federal government, under the national defense or
commerce powers of the Constitution, is entitled to act in the context
64 LISA SPEISSEGGER & CHERYL RUNYON, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT: A CHECKLIST
OF ISSUES (2002).
65 See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin, School Vaccination Re-
quirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, KY.L.J. 831, 851 (2001-
2002) (discussing the historical development of school vaccine requirements in state
law).
66 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905) (holding that public
health responses were within a state's police power unless the statute has "no real or
substantial relation" to public health, public morals, or public safety or the statute is,
"beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law").
67 See, e.g., George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liber-
ties, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1337 (2002) (criticizing the Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act).
68 Federal agencies such as the CDC, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the Department of Homeland Security are centrally important in averting and
containing bioterrorism.
HEALTH MATRIX
of multi-state threats to health and security.69 However, states have
"plenary" authority to protect the public's health under their reserved
powers in the Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has made clear
that states have a deep reservoir of public health powers, conceiving
of state police powers as an "immense mass of legislation [in which]
[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, [and] health laws of every descrip-
tion.., are component[s] of this mass., 70 The Supreme Court, more-
over, has regarded federal police powers as constitutionally limited,
and has curtailed the expansion of national public health authority.71
The assertion of federal jurisdiction, of course, does not obviate
the need for adequate state and local public health power.72 States and
localities have been the primary bulwark of public health in America.
From a historical perspective, local and state public health agencies
pre-dated federal agencies. Local Boards of Health were in operation
in the late 18th Century and state agencies emerged after the Civil
War. Federal health agencies, however, did not develop a major pres-
ence until Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal. State and local
agencies have played a crucial role in infectious disease control from
colonial and revolutionary times, through the industrial revolution, to
the modem times.73
From an economic and practical perspective, most public health
activities take place at the state and local level - e.g., surveillance,
communicable disease control, and food and water safety. States and
localities probably would be the first to detect and respond to a health
emergency and would have a key role throughout. This requires states
to have effective, modem statutory powers that enable them to work
along side federal agencies. It does not matter which governmental
entity (federal or state) has the primary responsibility in any given
case. What is important is that both levels of government operate
with adequate resources and sound legal foundations.
69 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 (giving Congress the authority to tax
and regulate commerce). See also United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696, 698
(1948) (upholding Congress' authority to prohibit misbranding of drugs under its
interstate commerce powers).
70 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824).
71 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566-68 (1995) (striking down a
federal statute prohibiting guns in school zones as an unlawful expansion of Con-
gress' commerce clause powers).
72 See Michael Moser, Bioterrorism and Civil Liberties, 347 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 856 (2002) ("Historically and legally, state and local public health agencies in
this country have had the lead role in responding to outbreaks or suspected outbreaks
of communicable disease within their jurisdictions").
73 See GoSTIN, supra note 5, at 242-48 (chronicling the rise of local authority
over matters of public health).
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4. Declaration of a Public Health Emergency
Critics express concern that the Model Act could be triggered too
easily, creating a threat to civil liberties. As mentioned above, com-
munity-based organizations originally objected to the idea that a Gov-
ernor might declare a public health emergency for an endemic disease
such as HIV/AIDS or influenza. Although this may have been a prob-
lem with the initial version of the Model Act, the current version vir-
tually excludes HIV/AIDS and influenza through its requirement that
a disease must be "novel or previously controlled or eradicated."
Legal scholars express concerns that a Governor could declare an
emergency for theoretical or low-level risk. However, the drafters set
demanding conditions for a Governor's declaration, clearly specifying
the level of risk. A public health emergency may be declared only in
the event of bioterrorism or the appearance of a novel or previously
controlled or eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin that poses
a high probability of a large number of deaths or serious disabilities.
Indeed, the drafters rejected arguments from high-level federal and
state officials to set a lower threshold for triggering a health emer-
gency.
Finally, commentators suggest that Governors retain too much
discretion to declare a public health emergency. Yet, the Model Act
specifies clear criteria for triggering Gubernatorial powers and uses
language that fetters the exercise of discretion. As noted below, the
Model Act also allows the legislature and judiciary to intervene if the
Governor has acted outside the scope of his or her authority. Taken as
a whole, the drafters carefully limit the circumstances when the more
robust powers of the Model Act can be invoked.
5. Governmental Abuse of Power
Critics argue that Governors and public health authorities would
abuse their authority and exercise powers without justification. This
kind of generalized argument could be used to refute the exercise of
governmental power in any realm because executive branch officials
may over-reach. However, such general objections have never been a
reason to deny government the power to avert threats to health, safety,
and security. The answer to such general objections is to introduce
into the law careful safeguards to prevent officials from acting outside
the scope of their authority. The Model Act builds in effective protec-
tion against governmental abuse. It adopts the doctrine of separation
of powers, so that no branch wields unchecked authority. These
checks and balances offer a classic means of preventing abuse.
The Model Act creates several hedges against abuse: (1) the
Governor may declare an emergency only under strict criteria and, if
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feasible, with careful consultation with public health experts and the
community; (2) the legislature, by majority vote, can override the
Governor's declaration at any time; and (3) the judiciary can terminate
the exercise of power if the Governor violates the standards or proce-
dures of the Model Law or acts unconstitutionally. No law can guar-
antee that the powers it confers will not be abused. Much depends on
the wisdom of judges, the competency of health officials, and the vigi-
lance of a free citizenry. But MSEHPA counterbalances executive
power by providing a strong role for the legislature and judiciary. The
Model Act modernizes antiquated law and replaces it with clear crite-
ria, fair procedures, and robust entitlements that are conspicuously
absent from infectious disease statutes in the United States. There is
little more that any law could do to prevent abuse of power.
6. Personal Libertarianism
Critics imply that the Model Law should not confer compulsory
power at all. In particular, they object to compulsory powers to iso-
late or quarantine. Commentators reason that services are more im-
portant than power; that individuals will comply voluntarily with pub-
lic health advice; and that tradeoffs between civil rights and public
health are not required and even are counterproductive. Before re-
sponding to these criticisms, it is important to recognize that the
Model Act does not permit public health officials to vaccinate, test, or
medically treat people against their will. At most, individuals may be
isolated or quarantined to reduce their risk to others.
Certainly the HIV/AIDS epidemic has demonstrated that public
health and civil liberties can be mutually reinforcing - respect for
individual freedoms can promote the public's health.74 The CDC's
approach to legal preparedness for bioterrorism, moreover, stresses
the importance of community education and involvement in plan-
ning. 75 The goal is to facilitate public cooperation in the event of a
health crisis. Despite the undoubted importance of voluntarism, there
still remains a residual need for compulsory powers.
First, although the provision of services may be more important
than the exercise of power, the state undoubtedly needs a certain
74 See Jonathan Mann et al., Health and Human Rights, 1 J. HEALTH &
HUMAN RIGHTS 6, 20-21 (1994) (". .. HIV/AIDS may be illustrative of a more gen-
eral phenomenon in which individual and population vulnerability to disease, disabil-
ity, and premature death is linked to the status of respect for human rights and dig-
nity").
75 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PUBLIC HEALTH LEGAL
PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM (July 17, 2002) (unpublished).
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amount of authority to protect the public's health. Government must
have the power to prevent individuals from endangering others. It is
only common sense, for example, that a person who has been exposed
to an infectious disease should be required to be isolated if necessary
to prevent transmission to family, friends, or the community.
Second, although most people can be expected to comply will-
ingly with public health measures because it is in their own interests
and/or desirable for the common welfare, not everyone will comply.
Individuals may resist loss of autonomy, privacy, or liberty even if
their behavior threatens others. Provided that public health powers
are hedged with safeguards, individuals should be required to yield
some of their interests to protect the health and security of the com-
munity.
Finally, although public health and civil liberties may be mutually
enhancing in many instances, they sometimes come into conflict.
When government acts to preserve the public's health, it can interfere
with property rights (e.g., freedom of contract, to pursue a profession,
or to conduct a business) or personal rights (e.g., autonomy, privacy,
and liberty). The history of public health is littered with illustrations
of trade offs between public health and civil liberties. 76 It may be
fashionable to argue that there is no tension, but public health officials
need to make hard choices particularly in public health emergencies.
Individuals whose movements pose a significant risk of harm to
their communities do not have a "right" to be free of interference nec-
essary to control the threat. There simply is no basis for this argument
in constitutional law, and perhaps little more in political philosophy.
Even the most liberal scholars accept the harm principle - that gov-
ernment should retain power to prevent individuals from endangering
others.77
The Supreme Court has been equally clear about the limits of
freedom in a constitutional democracy. The rights of liberty and due
process are fundamental but not absolute. Justice Harlan in the foun-
dational Supreme Court case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts wrote:
"There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily
subject for the common good. On any other basis organized society
could not exist with safety to its members. 7 8 Critics argue, without
support from any judicial authority, that the Supreme Court's land-
76 See, e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 5, at 113-308 (providing examples of pri-
vacy, freedom of expression, bodily integrity, commercial regulation, and tort litiga-
tion-based trade-offs); GosTiN, supra note 30.
77 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, 4 vols. (1987-
1990).
78 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
HEALTH M TRIX
mark decision in Jacobson, reiterated by the Court over the last Cen-
tury, is no longer apposite. There is, according to this line of argu-
ment, a constitutional right to refuse interventions even if the individ-
ual poses a public risk. Yet, the courts have consistently upheld com-
pulsory measures to avert a risk,79 including the power to compulso-
rily test,8° report,81 vaccinate, 82 treat,83 and isolate 84 provided there are
clear criteria and procedures. Certainly, courts will use a higher stan-
dard if public health authorities tread on touchstones of personal lib-
erty such as the right to travel or bodily integrity. 85 Nevertheless, if
the state is responding to a demonstrable risk and adopts means rea-
sonably calculated to avert the harm, there is ample support in phi-
losophic theory and constitutional law to support the intervention.
86
7. Economic Libertarianism
Civil libertarians have not been the only group to critique the
Model Act. Businesses, as well as law and economic scholars, com-
plain that MSEHPA interferes with free enterprise. Most economic
stakeholders including the food, transportation, pharmaceutical, and
health care industries lobbied legislators and CLPH faculty. These
groups argue that they should not be compelled to share data with
government, abate nuisances, destroy property, and provide goods and
services without their express agreement.87
Generally speaking, the Model Law provides several kinds of
powers to regulate businesses: destruction of dangerous or contami-
nated property, nuisance abatements, and confiscation of property for
79 See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (upholding
forced administration of antipsychotic medication if the inmate is dangerous to him-
self or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest).
80 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
81 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
82 Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
83 See McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding
the state's compelling interest in reducing the spread of tuberculosis justified involun-
tary treatment).
84 See Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661 (1980) (recognizing the authority
of the state to involuntarily commit a person afflicted with certain communicable
diseases).
85 See Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34
VILL. L. REV. 933, 935-37 (1989) (noting that numerous law review articles assert
that, in contrast with Jacobson, strict scrutiny applies to public health laws to the
extent that they interfere with fundamental liberties).
86 See GOSTIN, supra note 5, at 99-100 (describing the government's burden
to evaluate its regulation of public health measures).
87 Sarah Lueck, States Seek to Strengthen Emergency Powers: Movement is
Raising Privacy and Civil-Liberties Concerns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2002, at A26.
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public purposes. All of these powers have been exercised historically
and comply with constitutional and ethical norms. If businesses have
property that poses a public threat, government has always had the
power to destroy that property.88 For example, if a rug were contami-
nated with anthrax or smallpox, government would certainly have the
power to order its destruction.
Similarly, if businesses are engaged in an activity that poses a
health threat, government has always had the power to abate the nui-
sance. 89 Businesses must comply with all manner of health and safety
regulations that interfere with economic freedoms. 90 Those who be-
lieve in the undeterred entrepreneur may not agree with health regula-
tions, but they are necessary to ensure that business activities to not
endanger the public.
Finally, government has always had the power to confiscate pri-
vate property for the public good.9' In the event of bioterrorism, for
example, it may be necessary for the state to have adequate supplies
of vaccines or pharmaceuticals. Similarly, government may need to
use health care facilities for medical treatment or quarantine of per-
sons exposed to infection.
Businesses argue that government should not have broad powers
to control enterprise and property. If these powers have to be exer-
cised, businesses want to ensure they are compensated according to
market values. The Model Act follows a classical approach to the
issue of property rights. Compensation of property owners is pro-
vided if there is a "taking" - i.e., the government confiscates private
property for public purposes (e.g., the use of a private infirmary to
treat and/or isolate patients). No compensation would be provided for
"nuisance abatements" - i.e., the government destroys property or
closes an establishment that poses a serious health threat. This com-
88 E.g., Perepletchikoff v. City of Los Angeles, 345 P.2d 261 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959) (holding that the city has the authority to demolish hotel to abate a nui-
sance).
89 E.g., City of New York v. New St. Mark's Baths, 562 N.Y.S.2d 642, 643
(App. Div. 1990) (upholding closure of bathhouses to abate a public health nuisance);
Bums v. Mayor and City Council of Midland, 234 A.2d 162, 165 (Md. 1967) (noting
that the legislature unquestionably has the authority to require the removal of a struc-
ture found to endanger public health).
90 E.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873) (upholding sanitary
regulations of slaughter-houses). See also, William J. Novak, THE PEOPLE'S
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
91 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982) (upholding statute that require private property owners to permit cable TV
operators to place cable on their premises provided that they are justly compensated
for the occupation).
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ports with the extant constitutional "takings" jurisprudence of the Su-
preme Court.92 If the government were forced to compensate for all
nuisance abatements, it would significantly chill public health regula-
tion.
In American history and constitutional law, private property has
always been held subject to the restriction that it not be used in a way
that posed a health hazard. As Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court observed as early as 1851: "We think it set-
tled principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil society,
that every holder of property ... holds it under the implied liability
that it shall not be injurious to the rights of the community." 93
8. Safeguards of Persons and Property
The real basis for debate over public health legislation should not
be that powers are given, because it is clear that power is sometimes
necessary. The better question is whether the powers are hedged with
appropriate safeguards of personal and economic liberty. The core of
the debate over the Model Act ought to be whether it appropriately
protects freedoms by providing clear and demanding criteria for the
exercise of power and fair procedures for decision-making. It is in
this context that the attack on MSEHPA is particularly exasperating
because critics rarely point to areas where the standards and proce-
dures in MSEHPA could be strengthened. Nor do they compare the
safeguards in the Model Act to those in extant public health legisla-
tion.
It is important to note that powers over individuals (e.g., testing,
physical examination, treatment, and isolation) and businesses (e.g.,
nuisance abatements and seizure or destruction of property) already
exist in state public health law. These powers have been exercised
since the founding of the Republic. 94 MSEHPA, therefore, does not
contain new, radical powers over the individual. Most tellingly, the
Model Act contains much better safeguards of individual and eco-
nomic liberty than appear in communicable disease statutes enacted in
the early-to-mid 2 0th Century.
92 See, e.g. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (find-
ing that the government may only deprive an individual of all economic uses of his or
her property without compensation when the owner's use of property were not origi-
nally part of his title).
93 Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1851).
94 See, e.g., James A. Tobey, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW (1939); LEROY PARKER &
ROBERT H. WORTHINGTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY, AND THE
POWERS AND DUTIES OF BOARDS OF HEALTH, at xxxviii-xxxix (1892).
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Unlike older statutes, MSEHPA provides clear and objective cri-
teria for the exercise of powers, rigorous procedural due process, re-
spect for religious and cultural differences, and an explicit set of enti-
tlements for humane treatment. First, the criteria for the exercise of
compulsory powers are based on the modem "significant risk" stan-
dard enunciated in constitutional law and disability discrimination
law. The Model Act also requires public health officials to adopt the
"least restrictive alternative." Second, the procedures for intervention
are rigorous, following the most stringent requirements set by the Su-
preme Court, including the right to counsel, presentation and cross
examination of evidence, and reasons for decisions. Third, the Model
Act shows toleration of vulnerable groups through its requirements to
respect cultural and religious differences whenever consistent with the
public's health. Finally, the Model Act provides a new set of rights to
care and treatment of persons subject to isolation or quarantine. These
include the right to treatment, clothing, food, communication, and
humane conditions.
In summary, MSEHPA provides a modem framework for effec-
tive identification and response to emerging heath threats, while dem-
onstrating respect for individuals and toleration of groups. Indeed, the
CLPH agreed to draft the law only because a more draconian ap-
proach might have been taken by governments acting on their own
and responding to public fears and misapprehensions. 95
V. RE-THINKING THE PUBLIC GOOD
American values at the turn of the 2 1st century fairly could be
characterized as individualistic. There was a distinct orientation to-
ward personal and proprietary freedoms and against a substantial gov-
ernment presence in social and economic life. The attacks on the
World Trade Center and Pentagon and the anthrax outbreaks re-
awakened the political community to the importance of public health.
Historians will look back and ask whether September It , 2001 was a
fleeting scare with temporary solutions or whether it was a transform-
ing event.
There are good reasons for believing that resource allocations,
ethical values, and law should transform to reflect the critical impor-
tance of the health, security and well being of the populace. It is not
that individual freedoms are unimportant. To the contrary, personal
liberty allows people the right of self-determination, to make judg-
95 See generally David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002)
(noting numerous examples where the Bush Administration has sacrificed the civil
liberties of non-citizens in response to September 1 th).
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ments about how to live their lives and pursue their dreams. Without
a certain level of health, safety, and security, however, people cannot
have well-being; nor can they meaningfully exercise their autonomy
or participate in social and political life.
My purpose is not to assert which are the more fundamental inter-
ests: personal liberty or health and security. Rather, my purpose is to
illustrate that both sets of interests are important to human flourishing.
The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act was designed to de-
fend personal as well as collective interests. But in a country so tied
to rights rhetoric on both sides of the political spectrum, any proposal
that has the appearance of strengthening governmental authority was
bound to travel in tumultuous political waters.
